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Just before the 1976 elections, the future President of the United States, 
Jimmy Carter, was asked by a South African Financial Mail correspondent: 1 
Would you free up American investment through Export-Import Bank 
loans and otherwise encourage the increase in private American lending 
and corporate activity in South Africa? 
He replied : 
Yes indeed ... 
Economic development, investment commitment and the use of eco-
nomic leverage against what is, after all, a government system of repres-
sion within South Africa, seems to me the only way to achieve racial 
justice there. 
Since then, the Carter administration has reviewed the entire southern 
African policy and reaffirmed the conclusion that continued United States 
corporate investment provides a lever for social change towards majority 
rule in the region. This position has been reiterated frequently by United 
Nations Ambassador Andrew Young. Young seems - - erroneously -- to 
believe that the civil rights battle in the United States was won through the 
intervention of the giant corporations. As he has explained, 2 he plans to 
work through the United Nations Association 
... to see if we can't begin to evolve business ethics and do some of 
the things internationally that we made business do in the South [of 
United States] . 
He simply rejects the stance taken by the southern African liberation move" 
men ts and the presidents of the neighboring "frontline" states: 
I don't consider armed struggle at this point ... a viable option. 
We're not dealing with Portugal any more. We're dealing with South 
Africa and that's the strongest military power in Africa .. : 
To understand the illusory nature of the Carter administration's policy 
towards southern Africa, however, it is essential to analyze the way United 
States transnational corporate penetration has and continues to help build up 
the South African industrial-military complex. 
The winds of change that swept through the vast African continent after 
World War II had, by the early 1970s, freed over 40 African nations from the 
political bonds of outright colonialism. Only in southern Africa did white mi-
nority regimes cling to their undemocratic rule . . Stimulated by the largest 
dollar amount of investments of transnational corporations in any single state 
in Africa,3 South Africa had, by the end of the 1960s, burgeoned into a rela-
tively highly industrialized core, dominating and further underdeveloping the 
peripheral economies of neighboring countries. 
South Africa's vaunted industrial growth was achieved through the sys-
tematic impoverishment of the African majority, 80 per cent of the popula-
tion. Over the years, the white minority had exercised state power to deny 
African access to the land and the nation's mineral and agricultural riches . . 
Africans were systematically deprived of any choice except to provide the 
low-<:ost labor that rendered white-owned mines and large agricultural estates 
profitable. In essence, the whites employed their racist ideology to rationa-
lize the shaping of a rigid, state capitalist regime in which Africans were co-
erced into one of the lowest-paid working classes in the world.4 
By the end of World War II, seven intertwined, oligopolistic mining finance 
houses had emerged, holding vast accumulations of capital available for 
investment in other sectors of the economy.5 The dominant group, to this 
day, is Anglo-American, which itself has grown into a transnational corpor-
ation with global assets worth about $7 billion. The stock ownership of An-
glo-American is intertwined with that of the United States Engelhard Corpor-
ation, whose former head was closely associated with Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson.6 
The mining finance houses joined the Nationalist Government in the post-
war decades in a state-capitalist partnership to invest in deepening and ver-
tically integrating the expanding manufacturing industries. Government 
sponsored, and in most cases subsidized, parastatal corporations initiated the 
basic iron and steel, chemical., and energy industries, laying the foundation 
for further industrial growth.7 Poor whites who had been squeezed off the 
land by large-scale, increasingly mechanized agriculture, pressed for intensifi-
cation. In an increasing competition for employment in the growing manu-
facturing sector, the color bar guaranteed white access to highly paid skilled 
jobs. Black South Africans were forced to remain as an unskilled labor re-
serve, pem1itted only to earn wages below poverty level.8 African families 
have been removed to so-called "Bantustans," crowded onto less than 13 
percent of the national land area. Adults are permitted to leave only if they 
carry passes proving they hold jobs in white-owned mines, farms, or factories. 
Women, children and old men, along with increasing numbers of unemployed 
able-bodied young men, are supposed to support themselves on eroded, over-
crowded soils with outmoded farming technologies. The false assumption 
that those who live in the Dantustans are self-supporting is used to justify 
paying wages to those who obtain jobs at a level which is less than the mini-
mum required to support their families. 
The impoverishment of the African population is well-documented:9 
Husbands, wives, mothers and children are often separated for most of the 
year as family members desperately migrate in search of jobs to earn a little 
cash to buy the bare necessities of life. Education, health facilities, and hous-
ing are grossly inadequate. Hunger and malnutrition are chronic. Over half 
of all African babies die before reaching the age of six. 
This systematic improverishment of the African population has enabled 
South Africa's minority-ruled state-capitalist regime to continue to accumu-
late capital to build its industrial base. Its success has been duly noted by 
Western statisticians who have removed South Africa from the list of "devel-
oping" African nations to place it among the so-called "developed" countries 
of the world.10 
The mining finance houses, economically powerful as they are, and despite 
their close links V.'ith tl1e myriad of government parastatals which have stimu-
lated industrial growth, have not achieved this alleged "growth miracle" 
alone. Transnational corporations and .banks have played an increasingly 
crucial role. TI1ey provide essential machinery and equipment, embodying 
the most up-to-date technologies, as well as mobilizing additional capital 
to finance their import. 
Transnational corporate investments in South Africa grew so rapidly --· 
especially after the Sharpeville Massacre - - that they now constitute about 
$10 billion, about a fourth of the total capital investment in the country .11 
Officially-reported direct investment by United States corporations consti-
tutes about a fifth of the total.12 If United States corporate investment 
through affiliates based in Canada and Europe, especially England, were 
added, along with minority shareholdings in South African fim1s, the United 
States share of foreign investment there would be considerably larger.13 
United States investments in every sector of the South African economy 
except oil exceed those in any other African country .14 (See Table I) Even 
in the case of oil, despite the fact that South Africa has no known oil depo-
sits, about 23 per cent of the African investments of United States com-
panies are in South African oil refinery and distribution networks . 
Table l-UNITED STATES INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICA 
A. U.S. Investment in South Africa Compared to the Res t o f Africa 
(in millions of U. S. dollars) 
United States United States 
Inves tm ent in Investment in Africa 
South Africa outside South Africa 
1968 1975 1968 1975 
All industries 
Book value at year end 692 I . ~68 981 2,307 
Earnings 120 136 551 515 
Reinvested earningsa 26 64 45 181 
Balance of payments 
income to United States 74 73 509 356 
Mining and Smelting 
Book value at year end 78 (D) 309 486 
Earnings 31 7 38 38 
Reinvested carningsa 
- 7 2 9 10 
Petroleum 
Book value at year end 147 405 1,567 1,337 
Earnings (D) (D) 501 414 
Reinvested earningsa (D) 28 15 139 
Manufacturing 
nook value at year end 332 700 68 231 
Earnings 37 56 5 17 
Reinvested earningsa 16 33 4 9 
Finance and Insurancec 
Book value at year end (D) 59 
Earnings - t 10 
Reinvested earnings - 7 4 
Tradec Book value 134 185 
. Book value at year end Earnings 52 183 6 85 
Earnings 12 16 
Reinvested earnings3 Reinvested 5 10 
Otherc Earningsa 17 16 
Book value at year end 51 133 
Earnings (D) 18 
Reinvested earnings 2 11 
. TransEort, Communica-
tiom and Utilitiesc 
Book value at year end * 66 
Earnings 0 3 
Reinvested Earnings 0 - 2 
13. United States Investment in South Africa Compared to United States Invest ment in 
Other Africa, 1968 and 1975 
South Afr ica Other Africa 
I 968 1975 I 968 I975 
United States investment in secto r as percent of total U.S. investm ent in areac 
All industries I 0tl.(l% 100.0% I 00.0% 
Mining and smelting I I .3 (()) 1-3.4 
Petroleum 2 1. 2 25.7 73 .3 
Manufacturing 50.0 44.4 3.8 
Transport, com munications and 
utilities 
Trade 
finance 
Other 
19.3 I 1.6 
(D) 
3.2 
9.4 
United States investment in area as percent of tota l U.S. investment in Africa 
All indu str ies 25.8% 40.6% 74. 2% 
Mining a nd smelt ing 20. I (D) 79 .9 
Petroleum 9 .3 23.2 90.7 
Manufacturing 83.0 75.2 17.0 
Other 27.2 
Finance and insurance (D) 
Trade 19.4 68.3 80.6 
Transport, commu nications and 
utilities 
Rate of return on United Sta;es investmentsd 
All industries I 7.3% 8.6% 27.8% 
Petroleum (()) (D) 35.3 
Mining and smel ti ng 39 .7 (()) 12.3 
Manufacturing I I. I 8.0 7.3 
Other (()) 
Finance and insurancec 38.8 (D) 3.2 
Tradec 6.6 
100.0% 
2 1. I 
57.9 
10.0 
2.9 
3. 7 
2.6 
5 .8 
59.4% 
(()) 
76.7 
24.8 
72.3 
(D) 
3 1.7 
22.3 r;;. 
31.0 
7.8 
7.3 
13.5 
16.9 
18.8 
Source: Unit ed States Departm ent of Commerce, Sun1ey of Current Bminess, August 
1976; October 1969. 
Notes to Table l: 
a. "Reinvested Earnings" represents the share of United States owners in reinves-
ted earnings of foreign corporations. 
b. Although overall figur.es foi: United States investment in manufacturing are not 
given, they may be estimated by summing the figures which are given for manufacturing 
by sector. On one sector, "Other manufacturing," is not given a value; the estimate ob-
tained of S 19 million, probably is understated. Nevertheless, this figure for United 
States investments in manufacturing in Nigeria would make it the second most imporc 
tant area in Africa for United States manufacturing investments. 
c. u;1til 1974, finance and trade were included in "other," as indicated. Thereafter 
they were giveri separately. The b3.sis of calculation also appears to have been changed, 
so the results are not entirely comparable. Transport, communications and public utili-
ties were separated out in 1975. 
d. Earnings as a per cent of book value. 
e. Figures· for "Other Africa," are for 1970, not 1968, as there seems to be some dis-
crepancy in the data for that area in the latter year. 
(D) -Suppressed to avoid identification of specific companies by Survey of Cur-
rent Business. 
About 600 subsidiaries and affiliates of United States transnational cor-
porations are doing business in South Africa. 15 The 13 largest United States 
transnational corporations, however, are estimated to own about two-thirds of 
all United States corporate assets there. (Table 2-) They are also among the 
largest companies in the world, owning about 25 percent of the assets and 
selling a fourth of the output of the top 200 companies in the United States 
itself. Most, if not all, are represented on the boards of directors of the two 
large Rockefeller banks, Chase Manhattan and Citicorp, which have vastly 
increased their business in South Africa in recent years. 
Various reasons may be advanced to explain why transnational corpora-
tions, especially those from the United States, have expanded their invest-
ment in South Africa, despite the undemocratic, oppressive rule imposed by 
the white minority. As Table 1 shows, they have reaped a higher rate of pro-
fit from their investments in South Africa than anywhere else on the conti-
nent except in the case of oil. Apparently, South African interests also have 
cleverly taken advantage of the competition between transnational corpora-
tions based in different nations in order to attract their investrnents.16 Fur-
them10re, a number of transnational manufacturing firms see their invest-
ments in South Africa as stepping stones for entering the markets of other 
African and Third World countries. 17 . 
Table 2: ESTIMATED INVESTMENTS OF THIRTEEN LARGE 
UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA IN 1972 
% of Re-
ported Total 1 Rank 
Approximate United States Among 
United States Investment Investment in United States 
Name of Firm Owner(s) ($000,000) South Africa Firms2 
Caterpillar (Africa) Caterpillar 6.4 0.7 34 
and Barlow 
Caterpillar 
Chrysler South Chrysler 45.0 5.0 4 
Africa 
Firestone South Firestone 25-303 3.0 37 
Africa 
Ford (South Ford 80-100 11.0 3 
Africa) 
South African GE 55 6.1 5 
General Electric 
General Motors GM 125 14.l 
South Africa 
Goodyear South Goodyear 15 1.7 14 
Africa 
IBM (South Africa) IBM 8.44 1.0 8 
Standard Telephone ITT 50-70 7.8 9 
and Cables (plus 
other companies) 
123 3M South Africa 3M 1.3 50 
Mobil Oil Southern Mobil 874 9.7 7 
Africa, Mobil 
Refining Co., SA 
Caltex Oil (South Texaco and 103 11.4 6 
Africa) Standard Oil 
of California 
Chrome Corporation Union Carbide n.a. n.a. 28 
(South Africa) 
Notes: lTotal United States investment calculated at United States $900 million. 
21.e. Rank among United States firms in the Fortune list of largest United 
States firms. 
3Estimated by CIS from available data. 
4Figure from source other than company. 
Source: Owrch Jnvestmenu, Corporations and Southern Africa, p. 33. 
Table 3-'WAGES PAID BY SOME UNITED STATES TRANSNATIONAL MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1971-2 
·Avg. African wage 
Avg~ annual Avg. annual as per cent of 
South African African Number of Vihite Number of Poverty Datum Line 
Parent Company Affiliate wage Africans wage Whites (S 140/month)* 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. Caterpillar (Africa) S l ,670/yr 5 M: $7916/yr 24 99.49 
(Pty) Ltd F: $4125/yr 17 
Chrysler Corp. Chrylser South Africa SllO/mc 1114 N.A. 2,038 80.0 
(Pty) Ltd. (1972) (colored + 
African) 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Firestone South $70/mo 930 N.A. 620 50.0 
Company Africa (Pty) Ltd. (1 British (colored (1969) 
plant) +African) 
(1969) 
General Electric Co. South African S73/mo 145 $186/mo ) 52. l 
General Electric (unskilled) (unskilled) ) 
(Pty) Ltd . $104-164/mo 363 $281/mo ) 630 74.2-117.l (semiskilled) (semiskilled) ) 
$213/mo 242 $401-428/mo ) 152. l 
(skilled) (skilled) ) 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Goodyear Tire & $61-101/mo N.A. N.A. t-/.A. 43.5-72.1 
Company Rubber Co. (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd. 
lntema tional Tele- Standard Telephone $135/mo 445 N.A. 653 96.4 
phone & Telegraph and Cables (STC) (coloreds) 
Company 127 
(Africans) 
Table 3-WAGES PAID BY SOME UNITED STATES TRANSNATIONAL MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA - 1971-2 
Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing Co. 
Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing Co. 
(South Africa) 
(Pty) Ltd. 
(CONTINUED) 
$92.40/mo 
(unskilled) 
S 121.80/mo 
(semiskilled) 
600+ N.A. 400 66.0 
86.4 
Source: Corporate Wonnation Centre, Church Investment Corporations and Sou'them Africa (New York: National Council cf Church-
es, 1973). 
'"The University of Natal estimated the 1973 Poverty Datum Line, the minimum wage necessary for an average African family to "live . 
under humaniy decent conditions in the short run," as R94 a month. This only included food (R69.l l), clothes (RS.67), fuel and light 
(Rl.88), cleansing (R2.5l), accommodation (R6.92) and transport (R5.l l). It excluded such items as taxes, medical expenses, education, 
replacement of household equipment, etc., estimated to cost about R50 more. See Fifth Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 
1973 /4, Wages and Conditions of African Worken Employed by British Finn:r in South Africa (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, . 
197 4) Chapter 7, for discussion. 
Table 4 -STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT BY GENERAL MOTORS AND 
FORD AFFILIATES IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1972 
A. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION SOUTH AFRICA 
Hourly Employment by Work Grade Oassification and Race 
Total Colored and African 
White Colored African Total 
Work 
Grade 
L 146 196 342 
2 3 233 98 331 
3 2 326 110 436 
4 32 486 99 585 
5 5 267 24 291 
6 35 107 5 112 
7 50 46 4 50 
8 139 173 5 178 
9 268 55 10 65 
10 446 
11 92 
Total 1,072 1,839 551 2,390 
B. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
Hourl:z: Wage Structure b:z: Clas~ification and Race for 3,94 I Em.£1.o.z~ 
Per Ilour Population 
Grade Minimum .!>faximum White Colored Black 
Rands s Rands $ 
1 0.40 .51 0.58 .74 0 627 165 
2 0.42 .54 0.62 .79 0 777 15 
3 0.44 .56 0.66 .84 0 278 JOO 
4 0.46 .59 0.70 .90 0 432 16 
5 0.50 .64 0.74 .95 I 264 5 
6 0.56 .72 0.83 t.06 3 68 5 
7 0.62 .79 0.88 1.13 12 95 4 
8 0.69 .88 1.00 1.28 82 35 0 
9 0.90 1.15 1.00 1.28 297 51 5 
10 1.05 1.34 1.50 1.92 463 0 (} 
11 I. [ 0 1.41 1. 75 2.24 104 0 0 
Apprentices in 
Skilled trades 37 0 0 
999 2,627 315 
l Rand =$1.28 
Source: Corporate Information Centre, Church /!l ves tme11ts, Corporations and South-
ern Aji'ica (New York: 1973). 
Apparently the balatantly undemocratic rule of the . white minority does 
not inhibit most United States investors. It is noteworthy in this context that 
the Rockefeller-initiated Trilateral Commission (which included a number of 
top corporate personnel as well as President Carter and several individuals 
now holding high-ranking posts in his administration 18) has published re-
ports which argue, on the one hand, that the United States, Europe and Japan 
"increasingly need the developing countries as sources of raw materials, as 
export markets and, most important of all, as constructive partners in the 
creation of a workable world order." On the other hand, they maintain that 
advanced capitalist countries suffer from an "excess of democracy." These 
two arguments, combined, are apparently deemed adequate justification for 
supporting expanding investment in South Africa's blatantly undemocratic . 
economy. 
Examination of existing United States transnational corporate investments 
reveals the dangerously illusory character of the Carter administration argu-
ment that further expansion of United States corporate involvement in South 
Africa will provide leverage for social change to improve the conditions of 
the African population. First, the available evidence* shows that United 
States corporations have done little to significantly irnprove the wages and 
working conditions of their employees above those of Africans in other South 
African plants, certainly not sufficiently to introduced a significant change in 
the overall national pattern. 
As Table 3 shows, not only are the wages paid by United States corporate 
subsidiaries to their African workers far below those of white workers, they 
also are well below the Poverty Datum Llne (PDL), the minimum required to 
support a typical African family at bare subsistence levels. The wages paid 
are about a fifth to a tenth of those they would pay to their workers in the 
United States (see Table 4 ).20 
In early 1977, 12 of the largest United States firms -- including IJ3M, 
ITT, Union Carbide, General Motors, Citicorp, etc. -- pledged they would 
pay equal wages for equal work and open greater opportunities for upgrading 
to their African employees.21 They did not say how they intended to imple-
ment this pledge in the face of South African legislation and industry-wide 
agreements with white trade unions. The job segregation tl1at exists in South 
Africa makes mockery of pledges of equal pay for equal work; almost no 
Africans are allowed to do the same jobs as whites. That this is true in the 
*It is extremely difficult for p1ivate individuals or organizations to obtain accurate 
current infomtation on wages paid in South Africa. It would be useful if the United 
States Congress required the subsidiaries of transnational corporations to report on their 
employment and wage policies, as d.id the British Parliament. 
plants of the subsidiaries of United States firms is indicated by Table 4 : 
only · a handful of white and black employees are in positions where the issue 
would even arise. 
Even in the United States, where federal laws affinnatively require equal 
pay for equal work and opportunity for advancement for minorities and wo-
men, the same large United States finns have not contributed significantly to 
changing the existing disadvantageous patterns of employment and income.22 
In South Africa, the weight of the law and power of the state are directed 
to establishing and maintaining the apartheid system, the color bar and Ban-
tustans, to enforce the economic inequality of blacks. It seems unlikely that 
United States transnational corporations could succeed, even if they sought 
to contribute more effectively than they have in the United States, to alter 
the impact of this system to impoverish the masses of the black population. 
TI1e United States corporations offered no current data as to the wages 
and employment status of their African employees, nor did they provide the 
goals and timetables for specific advances which have become recognized in 
the United States as essential for the implementation of effective affirri1ative 
action. 
A small indication of how United States firn1s may seek to fulfill their 
pledge was given in a Wall Street Journal teport.23 A Mobil Oil Corporation 
spokesman described his firm's upgrading policies as they affected workers 
in a South African petroleum depot. The company reduced the number of 
white workers from seven to one supervisor, who was ultimately to be phased 
out. .Meanwhile, the number of blacks was increased by only three persons, 
from 37 to 40. The manager explained, "The rate of pay wasn't a factor. 
There was a fairly high rate of turnover among whites." He did not point out 
that his own figures showed that the number of workers --- now all black 
with only one exception, -- doing the san1e amount of work as before had 
been reduced by almost 18 percent. In other words, the policy was another 
way to obtain more output for less money. 
Union Carbide, in respons.e to stockholder protests, presented evidence 
concerning its employment and wages practices in two of its largest subsi-
diaries (see Table 5). Its 1976 data, despite some improvement, which admit-
tediy was made in response to shareholder pressure, indicates that over half 
its black employees still received a bare minimum living wage. Interestingly, 
the wage increases received by its liigher-paid black workers (about a fifth of 
the total) was much larger both absolutely and relatively than that for the 
vast majority of black workers. This appears likely to create an elite among 
the black workers. The black employees still had no union to represent them, 
although the company permitted them to organize liaison committees headed 
by white managerial personnel. 
Table 5-UNlON CARBIDE'S WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT POLICIES 
IN ITS TWO LARGEST SOUTH AFRICAN SUBSIDIARIES, 
UCAR MINERALS AND EMSA l 
Employment Wages of Blacks 1976 
1973 1976 % in- % of 
% of % of Rand crease estimated 
Employ- Total total Total total per by Poverty 
mcnt black work- black work- mo. by grade, Datum 
Grade (no.) force (no.) force grade 1973-6 Linc, 19762 
11-14 0 0.0% 48 7.2'/o 3 
7-10 40 9.9 118 17.7 278 3 +148% 215'(,, 
3-6 48 I I. 8 15 5 23 .2 168-222 +74 130-172 
l-2 318 78.3 346 52.9 131 -1 55 +71 101-120 
Source: Investor Responsibility Rc:;carch Center, "Corporate Activity in South Africa: 
Union Carbide Coq10ration ," Analysis E. , Supplement No. 8 (Washington : 1977). 
Notes: [Total Union Carbide employment in South Africa was 1,800, two thirds black. 
2
rn 1973, the PDL was R94 ($140) per month. 13y l976, it was approximately 
RI 29 \Financial Mail, 30 July I 976). It is estimated that about 150 percent 
of the PDL is needed for any sort of adequate life since the PDL provides only 
the barest essentials. 
3Not given. 
In the case of Cal lex, a subsidiary of Texaco and Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia, it claims to pay blacks equal pay for equal work, but its employment 
of blacks as a percentage of the total workforce has actually declined in the 
last three years.23a 
The illustory character of the potential for changing the wages and em-
ployment pattern in South Africa through expanded U. S. investments is not 
the critical issu.e. Far more significant is the fact that, even assuming U. S. 
corporate subsidiaries did try to improve the status of their African employ-
ees in violation of South African laws, continued expansion of their invest-
ments, far from introducing significant social change, is contributing to 
building the military-industrial foundations of the white minority's political 
and economic rule. 
The cr it ical contribution made by U.S. corporations to the South African 
industrial-military complex may be 1111derstood by exan1ining the pattern of 
their investments: four out of five U. S. dollars invested in manufacturing 
industry (and over 95 percent of those in the machinery and equipment in-
dustry) on the entire African continent arc concentrated in South Africa. 
(See Table 6). Elsewhere in Africa,24 U.S. firms have limited their activi-
ties primarily to establishing final-stage assembly and processing plants, 
mainly to retain a foothold in the tariff-protected markets of the independent 
Table 6- U. S. INVEST'.!LNT IN \!ANUfACTUR!NG. AfRICA EXCLL' D!NG SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH AfRICA, AND NIGERIA , 1975 1 
I Primary & ; 
I 
r ood Chernical fabricated j Transport 
Total produc ts products metals i \bchinery equipmen t Other 
l 
S mil_! ,-, $mill ~'< Sm ill ,., Sm ill ~f I Smill 'fr Sm ill :iC Sm ill % /0 .c 
I I i I 
Sou th 38. 8 '. ~ I Africa 700 75.Y{ 86 D 120 . 82 .27r 44 153 96.8~~ I03 D 193 68 .7'} 
Other I 
Africa 231 24.8 D D 26 17.8 71 61.7 5 3.2 D D 88 31.3 
of \\·hich: 
Nigeria D l * 13 8.9 3 2.6 I 2 1.3 0 D D D 
I I 
Source : U.S. Depar tm ent of _Comm l! rce , Sun·ey ofCurre11t Business, August 1976. 
No tL's: 1Perccnugcs indicate perce nt of U.S. in~·cstm~nt in manufacturing in Africa : Smill. is book value o f investment in millio ns of U. S. dolla rs. 
* less than 0. 1 percent 
0
supprcssed by source to avoid idcntit.i cation of specific co mpanies. 
countries. Even in Nigeria, with a population of over 70 million, U.S. manu-
facturing investment remains insignificant. Jn South Africa, in contrast, 
U. S. transnational corporations have built vertically-integrated industries. 
TI1ey produce parts and equipment locally including even basic machjnes and 
engines. 
G. M:.> Ford and Chrysler produce entire automobiles and trucks in South 
Africa .2J They sell their products, not only in South Africa, but also to 
other African countries and in some cases in Europe as well. Since the 
Japanese gJVernment prohibits Japanese firms from investing there, G. M. 
and Chrysler also import and assemble small car kjts in their South African 
plants which are produced by the affiliates in which they own shares in 
Japan.26 . 
General Electric and ITT have developed extensive production of tech-
nologically-advanced electrical equipment and appliances which are crucial 
for the development of modern industry as well as military activities.27 
Despite the United States government's proclaimed "voluntary" compliance 
with the U. N. embargo on all military assistance to South Africa, an ITT 
subsidiary also has provided equipment for the Simonstown Naval Base, 
and trained South African engineers to operate it. IBM is providing and 
servicing computers28 which have helped South Africa's white minority to 
overcome a critical shortage of skiUed labor wjthout upgrading blacks. 
U. S. oil companies.29 have assisted South Africa in surmounting the 
problems imposed by its lack of known oil deposits. They have provided 
important technology to enable South Africa's state-owned paratatal, SASOL 
to extract oil from coal, thus increasing the possibility of evading an oil 
embargo. Mobil . and Caltex have established about 60 percent of South 
Africa's oil refinery capacity. In 1975, Caltex announced plans to invest 
$135 million to double its Milncrton refinery capacity, adding 11 percent 
to South Africa's total refine1y output. The U.S. firms have enabled South 
Africa to evade the OPEC boycott. They obtain crude oil and distribute 
the finished products throughout Southern Africa. They arc required by law 
to sell about ten percent of their output to the South African g~weniment , 
and they maintain a close relationship with it. They even ship oil products to 
the illegal Rhodesian regime, in violation of U. N. sanctions. 
U. S. firms have contributed in several essential ways to the creation of 
South Africa 's nuclear power industry .30 In addition to its obvious military 
implications , this will reduce South Africa's reliance on imported oil. When 
General Electric wi thdrew rrom the competition for the contract to builu a 
nuclear power plant in South Africa because of U.S . citizen protest, a French 
firm, Framatome, was chosen . In fac~ a U. S.-owned firm, Westinghouse, 
owns 15 percent of the shares of the French firm and provides important 
technical assistance to it for nuclear projects. Other U. S. firms, including 
Allis Chalmers and Foxboro Corporations, have helped to design and con-
struct the South African Pelindaba research project to produce enriched 
uranium, which may be used not only for nuclear power plants but also for 
nuclear weapons. The U. S. government itself, through the Atoms for Peace 
Program, has already supplied enough enriched uranium for a significant 
development to produce nuclear weapons . 
The largest U. S. banking and financial institutions have assisted U. S.--
based transnational corporations to expand their stake in the South African 
military-industrial complex . Chase Manhattan and Citicorp31 in recent 
years have played an increasingly important role both directly and indirectly 
in South Africa. They have assisted U.S . manufacturing and mining interests 
to make contacts and obtain essential finance for their new investments there. 
Recently, U. S. banks have participated in the mobilization of hundreds of 
millions of dollars to enable the South African government and its parastatal 
corporations to surmount the current economic crisis. South Africa is con-
fronted by rising balance of payments deficits due to increased imports of 
military equipment and the high cost of oil. Its parastatal and private firms, 
unable to sell their output as the international economic crisis squeezes the 
South African markets , face serious financial losses. As a result , the Govern-
ment, parastatals and private firms have been · forced to borrow heavily on 
the international money market. South Africa's es ti mated international 
debt had , by the spring of 1977, soared to over $6 billion32 --large r than that 
of any developing country with the exception of Mexico and Brazil. 
Over one-third of South Africa's international debt has been arranged by 
U. S. bankers.33 As the South African Financial Mail has pointed out: 34 
A unique featu re of the market has been the support of the U. S. banks. 
Apparently more finance has come from this quartet than ever before ... 
Bankers reckon that, though Soweto has increased uncertainty, there 
has been no dramatic impact on South Africa's borrowing potential. 
Chase Manhattan , Citicorp, and the Morgan firm of Kidder, Peabody were 
among the major mobilizers of these vital funds. Many 6f their Joans were 
made directly to South African parastatals, and some went directly to the 
South African government, as the appendix demonstrates . . They provided 
finance for a range of purposes including the balance of payment and govern-
ment dellcits incurred in part because of the increasing expenditure for 
military hardware and the construction of nuclear projects by the Elec-
tricity Supply Commission. 
There is no reason to believe tlwt increasing fund s to strengthen South 
Africa's economic and military potential will persuade its white rulers to 
voluntarily permit Africans to participate in fundamental decisions regarding 
the political-economic structure of the nation. Prime Minister J. 13. Vorster 
has made it quite clear that his party does not plan to permit a peaceful 
transition to a regime in which the African majority has effective access to 
political power and_ the nation's productive resources. As recently as April 
1977, he reiterated.JJ that there are certain points on which he would not 
yield: These include the right of our white people to retain control of their 
own destiny , the maintenance of law and order, and the determination 
of the kind of economic: system under which we are to live and work. 
Whatever pious hopes for change may be voiced by U.S . government offi-
cials , the reality is that expanded U. S. transnational corporate investments 
and loans are contributing to building up an even more powerful military 
machinery to defend the racist South African regime against efforts of the . 
African majority to create .a democratic society. The African liberation 
movements and "frontline" pre.sidqnts have concluded, in sharp disagreement 
with U. S. Ambassador Andrew Young, that armed struggle is the only re-
1naining means to achieve majority rule in southern Africa. There can be 
little doubt that the continued expansion of U. S. investment serves to in-
crease the South African economic and military might and only prolongs that 
struggle. 
The Carter administration argues, however , that through the leverage ex-
erted by U. S. investment on South Africa, it will be possible to press South 
Africa's government to work more effectively for majority rule in neighboring 
Namibia and Zimbabwe. This argument also is dangerously illusory . The 
illegal white regime in Rhodesia only continues to exist because of South 
African support : South Africa provides its only outlet to the sea for its 
exports, its only sources of foreign exchange, and the only source of machin-
ery, equipment, and oil it requires for civilian and military purposes . Many of 
these are supplied through transnational corporate subsidiaries based in South 
Africa itse lf. If the South African government chose to enforce the U. N. 
economic and milit;:iry em bargo, the Rhodesian regime would be forced to 
transfer power immcdi;:itely to the Afric;:in majority. 
In both cases South Africa refuses to be guided by United Nations policy. 
It has insisted on arranging its own version of a transition &overnment for 
Namibia by excluding Walvis Bay from the negotiations . 3 It refuses to 
comply with United Nations sancti ons on Rhodesia and continues to provide 
the main economic and military support for that illegal regime. 
Analysis of the nature of South Afri can ties to the political economics of 
Namibia and Rhodesia · reveals the fal sity of the argument that continued 
United States investments will help to persuade the South African regime to 
press for substantive change in the neighborin g countries. On the contrary, 
expanded United States investment and loans in South Africa will only fur-
ther strengthen South Africa's ability to perpetuate the lop-sided pattern of 
economic development in neighboring countries which has depressed the 
levels of life of the masses of their populations to poverty levels even below 
that in South Africa. 
The political-economic links which enmesh South Africa's neighbors in a 
relationship of dependency upon that racist regime are linked to the world 
commercial network and are dominated and shaped by the transnational 
corporations which play such a crucial role in bui lding up South Africa's 
military-industrial economy. 
South African and transnational corporate investments have, over the last 
century, shaped Namibia's distorted economy into an appendage of that of 
South Africa.37 As in South Africa , blacks have been pushed back into 
"tribal reserves," from which adults are forced by poverty to migrate annu-
ally for jobs as contr;ict workers for the foreign-owned mining companies, 
settler farms, and factories. Their wages are even lower than those in South 
Africa. 
In this environment, transnation;i l and South African firms conduct prof-
itable business, siphoning out of the country an estimated third of the na-
tional product in the form of profits, interest, and high salaries of manage-
ment personnel. Two United St;ites firms, American Metal Climax (AMAX in 
which Standard Oil of California and Anglo American both own major shares) 
and Newmont Mining Company, arc the primary owners of Tsumeb,38 one of 
the largest mining complexes inNamibia. De Beers, an Anglo-American affili-
ate, exploits Namibia's rich diamond ores. Both produce primarily for ex-
port, contributing foreign exchange to the hard-pressed South African econ-
omy. South Africa's state-owned Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR)39 in 
cooperation with affiliates of Anglo American and other mining finance 
houses, owns mines which produce zinc and tin for its South African facto-
ries. The white settlers of Namibia, many of them of German extraction or 
from South Africa, produce mainly beef and karakul wool for export. South 
African ;incl transna lional companies fish and process their catch in factories 
that comprise about two-thirds of Namibia's tiny manufacturing sector. 
N;imi bia remains an im porfan t market for Sou th Africa's manufacturing in-
dustries, which provide about 90 percent of Namibia's imports.40 
The most controversial project in Namibia is the Rossing uranium mine,41 
being developed by the British firm Rio Tinto Zinc and by South African in-
terests . Much of its output is to be exported to England, France and pos-
sibly West Germany, contributing further to South Africa's foreign exchange 
e:irnings. Part of its output, however, will be shipped to Soulh Africa's 
Pelindab;i project fo r its own nuclear industry. 
For South Arrica, in short, Namibia provides low-cost raw materials and 
important roreign exchange earnings, as well as a much needed additional 
market for its manufacturing sector and valuable investible surpluses . For the 
. 
Namibian people , the systematic extension of the apartheid system has led to 
impoverishment and levels of life lower than in Sou th Africa. 
South Africa's political-economic ties to the white minority regime ruling 
in Zimbabwe are somewhat different than those in Namibia . The settler 
population, much of which trekked up from South Africa, utilized their po-
litical power in the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (1953-1963) 
to extract a share of the investible surpluses produced by the mines of 
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and labor from Nyasaland (now Malawi).42 
With these surpluses they built the infrastructure .needed to attract foreign 
firms to create an industrialize d economy second only to that of South Africa 
in sub-Saharan Africa.43 After Zambia and Malawi obtained independence, 
the white minority illegally declared independence (UDI) to forestall majority 
rule. In the nex t decade, an increasingly racist system, parallel to that of 
South Africa, was imposed on the bl ack population. Although they consti-
tute 95 percent of the population , Africans have been squeezed onto 40 per-
cent of the land area. As in South Africa, they are forced to migrate for paid 
· jobs at an average wage which has declined from 9.7 to 9.1 percent of the 
average "white" wage in the ten years after UDI.44 Most of their wages are 
below the Poverty Datum Line. 
South African firms, together with transnational corporate subsidiaries 
based in South Africa, dominate the mining and manufacturing industries of 
Rhodesia. They ship in machinery, equipment, parts, and materials (includ-
ing oil) which are vi tal in enabling the Rhodesians to evade the full impact of 
United Nations sanctions. Without this collaboration , the Rhodesian regime 
could not have survived. 
Unites States corporate subsidiaries based in South Africa have played a 
crucial role in this activity . Two examples are notorious: the United States 
firm, Union Carbide, mounted a powerful lobby in the United States to con-
vince Congress to pass the Byrd Amendment, permit ting the firm to export 
chrome from its Rhodesian holdings in open violation of the United Nations 
embargo which the United States government had signed; however, after the 
amendment was repealed in 1977 Union Carbide could continue to ship 
chrome to the United States, having refined it in its South African sub-
sidiary's ferrochrome plant. Whether the ore, in fact, still is mined in 
Rhodesia , remains unknown.45 
United States oil companies have continued to ship oil to Rhodesia from 
their South African refineries through bogus companies designed to conceal 
their continuing violation of United Nations and orftcially-declarcd United 
States policy .46 
United States government officials have refused to take action in these 
cases, however , on the grounds that subsidiaries of United States corpora-
tions are under South African, not United States, jurisdiction. In the cases, 
however of North Korea, Vietnam, and, at one time Cuba, United States 
authorities imposed regulations against "trading with the enemy" to halt 
similar activities by United States corporate subsidiaries, regardless of where 
they were based. 
The affiliates of other Uni ted States firms operate in Rhodesia under their 
internationally-known brand names. These include such well-known compa-
nies as Ford, Coca-Cola, Woolworth, and General Electric.47 The National 
Grindlays Bank, in which Citicorp owns 49 percent of shares, helps arrange 
finance for illegal tr;ide and investments in Rhodesia.48 
The most probable outcome of United States governmental efforts to 
exert leverage to install a "moderate" Zimbabwean government will be to 
leave intact the underlying system of exploitation which has made that 
corporate investment so highly profitabl e. Transnational corporate invest-
ment and finance may influence the South African regime to cooperate by 
pressing for cosmetic change, but it is unlikely to urge any fundamental 
change in the political and economic status quo. 
The South African government and its transnational corporate allies have 
made it clear that they fear the emergence of governments in neighboring 
countries which might pursue policies parallel to those initiated in the 
People's Republics of Mozambique and Angola. In Those countries, FRELIMO 
and MPLA, steeled and united in ten years of guerrilla warfare, have begun to 
use state power to transform tl1e national political economies towards social-
ism .49 Having gained control of the "commanding hei gl~ts" (banks, export-
import trade and, increasingly, basic industry) they have begun to imple-
ment plans to build self-reliant, integrated economies capable of providing 
productive employment opportunities and raising the levels of living for the 
masses of their populations. They are rebuilding their formerly settler-
clominatecl agricultural sectors through introduction of producers ' coopera-
tives. They are re-directing industries lo meet the needs of the people. (See 
chapters by Davidson, lsaacman, and Minter.) In this context, they are re-
examining contractual relations with the South African and transnational 
corporations which had been created by the Portuguese colonists to take 
advantage of their raw materials and markets, and to siphon out the investi-
ble surpluses. 
Measures such as th ese threaten the continued undemocratic rule of the 
South African regime and the profitable activities of transnational corpora-
tions. The age-old bogey of "communism" has been resurrected SO in an 
effort to unite South Africa and th e Western allies it seeks in a battle to 
stern the winds of national liberation which are sweeping southward with 
ever greater force. 
The South African regime, in cooperation with the NATO powers, is 
taking more concrete steps. The Katangan uprising aga inst the corrupt gov-
emment of President Mobutu in Zaire has become the excuse for a massive 
build-up of military hardware and troops on the northern borders of An-
gola.51 France, West Germany and Belgium have airlifted military supplies 
into southern Zaire. Morocco, currently the leading recipient of United 
States military assistance in Africa, sent over one thousand well-equipped and 
trained soldiers. Egypt, within a few days after President Sadat's talks with 
President Carter, promised military assistance. South Africa, which had long 
had economic ties with the Zairean government and business interests and 
which today provides Zaire's main rail route to the sea through Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, provided financial assistance and oil products. A representative 
of BOSS (South Africa 's Bureau of State Security) was reported to be in 
Lubumbaslu.52 At the same time, thousands of South African troops are re-
ported to be in Namibia .53 These events seem to lend weight to President 
Agostinho Neto's asse rtion that a plan entitled "Operation Cobra" or 
"Luanda for Christmas" was afoot to overthrow his government. 
Press reports in the United States revealed only bits and pieces of the un.-
folding story. It is apparen t , however, that in this context United States 
government efforts to encourage expanded United States transnational 
corporate investment in South Africa could only serve to strengthen South 
Africa's military-industrial capacity to conduct open and covert maneuvers to 
undermine· and , if possible, to destroy national liberation movements and 
truly independent governments. It is becoming increasingly evident that only 
the success of these movements is likely to lead to meaningful efforts to 
restructure the regional political economy in order to provide productive 
employment opportu1tities and to raise the levels of life for the majority of 
the peoples of southern Africa . 
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